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Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Get the ADSL Account Information.

So many ADSL modem common setup with default password.It listing below.
So,why don' t you cannot get the ADSL account information.
You can use some wide tool as Angry IP Scan to find the IP range of ADSL ISP supply.
When you login to ADSL modem.You can see Usename,Password of ADSL ISP supply.
But password is hidden.You can't see the password.How???
With Snadboy Revelation V2 you can get user and password of ADSL Account.You just download and install it and run.You can see true password.Believe me.Try it.

Here is default password list of the most popular modem and router:

362 Vendors, 1677 Passwords
Biodata 360 Systems 3COM
Accelerated Networks ACCTON Acer
Actiontec Adaptec ADC Kentrox
AdComplete.com Adtech Adtran
Advanced Integration AirLink Plus Aironet
Airway Aladdin Alcatel
Allied Telesyn Allnet Allot
Alteon Ambit AMI
AmpJuke Amptron Apache
Apache Project APC Apple Computer
Arrowpoint Aruba Asante
Ascend AST Asus
AT&T Attachmate Audioactive
Autodesk Avaya Avenger News System (ANS)
AWARD Axis Axis Communications
Bay Networks Bea BestPractical
Bewan Billion Bintec
Biostar BizDesign Borland
Breezecom Brocade Brother Industries Ltd.
BT Buffalo/MELCO Busybox
Cabletron Cayman CGI World
Chase Research Check Point Chuming Chen
Ciphertrust Cisco Cisco-Arrowpoint
Claris Cobalt Colubris Networks
Comcast SMC Comersus Compaq
Compualynx Conceptronic Concord
Conexant Crystalview CTX International
Cyberguard CyberMax Cyclades
D-Link Daewoo Dallas Semiconductors
Data General Datacom DataWizard Technologies Inc.
Daytek Debian Deerfield
Dell Develcon Dictaphone
Digicorp Digicraft Software Digital Equipment
Dlink Draytek Draytek Corp
DuPont DVB Dynalink
Dynix Library Systems Edimax Efficient
Elron Elsa Eminent
Enhydra Enox Entrust
Epox Ericsson eSeSIX Computer GmbH
Exinda Networks Extended Systems Extreme Networks
F5 Fastwire Flowpoint
Fortinet Foundry Networks Freetech
FrontRange Solutions Funk Software Galacticomm
Gandalf Gateway Geeklog
General Instruments glFtpD Globespan Virata
Gossamer Threads Inc. GrandStream Groupee, Inc.
GuardOne H2O Project Hayes
Hewlett-Packard Honeynet Project Horizon DataSys
Hosting Controller IBM Informix
Infrant Inova Integrated Networks
Intel IntelliTouch Interbase
Intermec Internet Archive Inventel Wanadoo
Ipswitch IRC IronPort
Iwill JD Edwards Jetform
JetWay Johnson Controls Joss Technology
Juniper Justin Hagstrom Kethinov
Konica Minolta Kyocera LaCie
Lantronics Lantronix Leading Edge
Lenel Level1 LGIC
Lindsay Electronics Linksys Linux
Livingston Lucent Luxon Communications
M Technology MachSpeed Macsense
Magic-Pro Mambo Mantis
Megastar Mentec Mercury Interactive
Michiel Microcom Micron
Micronet Micronics Microplex
Microsoft Mike Peters Mintel
mklencke Motive Motorola
MP3Mystic Muze MySQL
Nanoteq NCR NetBotz
Netcomm Netcordia Netgear
NetGenesis Netopia Netscape
Netscreen NetworkICE Nexsan
NeXT NICE Systems Ltd. Nimble
Nokia Nortel Novell
NSI Nurit ODS
Open-Xchange Inc. OpenMarket Optivision
Oracle Osicom OvisLink Canada Inc.
Packard Bell Packeteer Pandatel
Patton PBX PHPReactor
phpTest Pikatel Pirelli
PlainTree PLANET Technology Corp. Pollsafe
Polycom PostgreSQL Powerchute
POWERLOGIC Prestige Prime
PrimeBase Proxim QDI
QualiTeam Quantex Quest Software
Radvision Raidzone Rainbow
Ramp Networks RapidStream Raritan
RayTalk Redcreek Communications RedHat
Remedy remote-exploit Research
Research Machines Resumix Ricoh
Rizen RM RNN
Rodopi rPath RSA
Saba Sambar Technologies Samuel Abels
SAP Schneider Electric Seagull Scientific
Securicor3NET Semaphore Shiva
Shuttle Siemens Corp Silicon Graphics
Site Interactive Sitecom SMC
Smith & Bentzen Snom Sonicwall
Sony Ericsson Sourcefire Sovereign Hill
Spider Systems Ssangyoung Sun
SuperMicro Surecom Sybase
Symantec SysKonnect Tandberg
Tasman Telappliant Telebit
Telelec Telus Terayon
TextPortal Tim Schaab Tiny
Tinys TMC TopLayer
Toshiba Trend Micro Trintech
TYPO3 U.S. Robotics Unex
UNIX Unknown UTStarcom
Verifone Veritas Verity
vertex Vextrec Technology VieNuke
Vina Technologies Virtual Programming Visa VAP
Vobis VoiceGenie Technologies Vonage
VPASP WatchGuard Web Wiz
Webmin Webramp Westell
Wim Bervoets Wireless, Inc. WWWBoard
X-Micro Xerox Xinit Systems Ltd.
Xylan Xyplex Yuxin
Zenith ZEOS Zeus
Zoom Zyxel


You can download Snadboy at:http://www.snadboy.com/RevelationV2.zip

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

VoIP Security

McGrawHill Hacking Exposed VoIP Voice.Over.IP Security Secrets Solutions eBook
McGrawHill Hacking...
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Syngress How to Cheat at VolP Security (2007)
Syngress How to Ch...
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Asterisk Stability And Security
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Voice over IP (VoIP) has finally come of age and is being rapidly embraced across most markets as an alternative to the traditional public-switched telephone network (PSTN). VoIP is a broad term, describing many different types of applications (hard phones, softphones, proxy servers, Instant Messaging clients, peer-to-peer clients, and so on), installed on a wide variety of platforms (Linux, Windows, VxWorks, mobile devices, PCs, and so on), and using a wide variety of both proprietary and open protocols (SIP, RTP, H.323, MGCP, SCCP, Unistim, SRTP, ZRTP, and so on) that depend heavily on your preexisting data network's infrastructure and services (routers, switches, DNS, TFTP, DHCP, VPNs, VLANs and so on). Correspondingly, VoIP security is just as broad a subject thanks to the heterogeneous nature of these environments found in the consumer, enterprise, carrier, and small/medium–sized business markets.


How the Book is Organized

This book is split into five completely different parts. Each part can be read without even touching the remaining four—so if the reader is interested only in the issues described in the selected part, he or she may consult only that part.

Part I. "Casing the Establishment"

The first part is introductory and describes how an attacker would first scan the whole network and then pick up specific targets and enumerate them with great precision in order to proceed with further advanced attacks through or from the hacked VoIP devices.

Chapter 1. "Footprinting a VoIP Network"

We begin the book by describing how a hacker first profiles the target organization by performing passive reconnaissance using tools such as Google, DNS, and WHOIS records, as well as the target's own website.

Chapter 2. "Scanning a VoIP Network"

A logical continuation of the previous chapter, this chapter provides a review of various remote scanning techniques in order to identify potentially active VoIP devices on the network. We cover the traditional UDP, TCP, SNMP, and ICMP scanning techniques as applied to VoIP devices.

Chapter 3. "Enumerating a VoIP Network"

Here, we show active methods of enumeration of various standalone VoIP devices, from softphones, hard phones, proxies, and other general SIP-enabled devices. Plenty of examples are provided, along with a demonstration of SIPScan, a SIP directory scanning tool we wrote.

Part II. "'Exploiting the VoIP Network"

This part of the book is focused on exploiting the supporting network infrastructure on which your VoIP applications depend. We begin with typical network denial-of-service attacks and eventually lead up to VoIP conversation eavesdropping. While many of the demonstrated techniques originate from the traditional data security world, we applied them against VoIP devices and supporting network services.

Chapter 4. "VoIP Network Infrastructure Denial of Service (DoS)"

In this chapter, we introduce quality of service and how to objectively measure the quality of a VoIP conversation on the network using various free and commercial tools. Next, we discuss various flooding and denial of service attacks on VoIP devices and supporting services such as DNS and DHCP.

Chapter 5. "VoIP Network Eavesdropping"

This section is very much focused on the types of VoIP privacy attacks an attacker can perform with the appropriate network access to sniff traffic. Techniques such as number harvesting, call pattern tracking, TFTP file snooping, and actual conversation eavesdropping are demonstrated.

Chapter 6. "VoIP Interception and Modification"

The methods described in this chapter detail how to perform man-in-the-middle attacks in order to intercept and alter an active VoIP session and conversation. We demonstrate some man-in-the-middle methods of ARP poisoning and present a new tool called sip_rogue that can sit in between two calling parties and monitor or alter their session and conversation.

Part III. "Exploiting Specific VoIP Platforms"

In this part of the book, we shift our attention to attacking specific vendor platforms where each has unique security weaknesses and countermeasures. We demonstrate some of the attacks covered in the last few chapters in order to detail the vendor-specific best practices for mitigating them.

Chapter 7. "Cisco Unified CallManager"

We installed Cisco CallManager 4.x with Cisco hard phones in a fully homogenous Cisco-switched environment in order to perform many of the attacks we've already detailed.

We also cover the various best practices to apply to the Cisco switching gear to mitigate most of the network attacks covered in Part II.

Chapter 8. "Avaya Communication Manager"

Similarly, we installed a full Avaya Communication Manager along with Avaya hard phones to detail some of the specific attacks we covered in Part I and Part II.

Chapter 9. "Asterisk"

We targeted our SIP test bed running Asterisk with the similar attacks detailed in Part I and Part II. We also performed some basic platform testing on a subset of the SIP phones in our test bed.

Chapter 10. "Emerging Softphone Technologies"

In this chapter, we discuss some security issues with the emerging softphone services, such as Skype, Gizmo, and others. While these services have not yet dominantly emerged into the enterprise space, they are poised to do so through some interesting partnerships under way.

Part IV. "VoIP Session and Application Hacking"

In this part of the book, we shift our attention from attacking the network and device to attacking the protocol. The fine art of protocol exploitation can hand intruders full control over the VoIP application traffic without any direct access and reconfiguration of the hosts or phones deployed.

Chapter 11. "Fuzzing VoIP"

The practice of fuzzing, otherwise known as robustness testing or functional protocol testing, has been around for a while in the security community. The practice has proven itself to be pretty effective at automating vulnerability discovery in applications and devices that support a target protocol. In this chapter, we demonstrate some tools and techniques for fuzzing your VoIP applications.

Chapter 12. "Flood-Based Disruption of Service"

In this chapter, we cover additional attacks that disrupt SIP proxies and phones by flooding them with various types of VoIP protocol and session-specific messages. These types of attacks partially or totally disrupt service for a SIP proxy or phone while the attack is under way. Some of the attacks actually cause the target to go out of service, requiring a restart.

Chapter 13. "Signaling and Media Manipulation"

In this chapter, we cover other attacks in which an attacker manipulates SIP signaling or RTP media to hijack, terminate, or otherwise manipulate calls. We introduce no less than ten new tools to demonstrate these attacks. As with other attacks we have covered, these attacks are simple to execute and quite lethal.

Part V. "Social Threats"

In the same way that the traditional email realm has been inundated with spam and phishing, so too are we starting to see the evolution of these social nuisances into the VoIP world. This chapter focuses on how advertisers and scam artists will likely target VoIP users and how to help counter their advance.

Chapter 14. "SPAM over Internet Telephony (SPIT)"

Voice SPAM or SPAM over Internet Telephony (SPIT) is a similar problem that will affect VoIP. SPIT, in this context, refers to bulk, automatically generated, unsolicited calls. SPIT is like telemarketing on steroids. You can expect SPIT to occur with a frequency similar to email SPAM. This chapter describes how you can use the Asterisk IP PBX and a new tool called spitter to generate your own SPIT. This chapter also details how you can detect and mitigate SPIT.

Chapter 15. "Voice Phishing"

Voice phishing relies on the effective gullibility of a victim trusting a phone number much more than an email link. Also, for a fraction of the cost, an attacker can set up an interactive voice response system through a VoIP provider that is harder to trace than a compromised web server. Also, the nature of VoIP makes this type of attack even more feasible because most VoIP services grant their customers an unlimited number of calls for a monthly fee. This chapter details how these attacks are performed and how to detect them at their various stages.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Asterisk Hacking

Today,Asterisk become the most wide use solution for IP PBX.With Asterisk and one old PC ,you can building one system with many Application as:voicemail,Call forwarding,Music on hold,Call conferencing,v.vv.
So,you might be read this book,it;s truly useful for me when I'm development A NGN system called by Unified Messaging.I hope it can help you,too.Thank you.

Syngress Asterisk Hacking May 2007 eBook
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